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Provable Data Possession (PDP) is a cryptographic tool for auditing big data on a storage 
server or in the cloud. The goal of PDP is to efficiently verify that the server is storing the 
data. PDP provides probabilistic guarantees that the server is storing the information, and 
it will be available when needed, without accessing the entire file.  
In this work, we have developed a PDP module for the Charm cryptographic 
framework. We wrote an application programmer interface (API) for generic PDP 
schemes. We implemented the simple MAC-PDP scheme with efficient subroutines for 
sub-linear sampling. We hope that this work will encourage further study in the rapid 
prototyping and evaluation of new PDP schemes in the Charm framework. 
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Provable Data Possession (PDP) is a cryptographic tool for auditing remote data, 
held on a storage server or in the cloud. The goal of PDP is to allow a client to efficiently 
verify the data on the server, without retrieving the entire file (as required for traditional 
integrity mechanisms, like digital signatures). This ability makes PDP audits particularly 
efficient for verifying the integrity of big data, for which accessing the entire file is 
expensive in terms of bandwidth and time. PDP provides a probabilistic (rather than 
absolute) guarantee that the server is storing the information and it will be accessible 
when needed. The U.S. Federal Cloud Computing Strategy recommends vendors be held 
accountable for service failures, using active Service Level Agreement (SLA) compliance 
monitoring [1]. Likewise, the U.S. Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program 
(FedRAMP) mandates continuous, active monitoring of services [2]. PDP protocols 
provide such a mechanism for actively auditing outsourced storage. This is particularly 
relevant to the Intelligence Community and Department of Defense, both of which face 
big data management problems. For example, the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency anticipates collecting on the order of four petabytes, annually [3]. We believe 
PDP can be a “game changing” technology for securing big data in the context of cloud 
technologies. 
Efficiency is integral to PDP audits; however, an in-depth cost comparison of 
PDP schemes is largely absent from the literature. Existing cost analyses consist of 
asymptotic costs measuring communication and round complexity, and small-scale 
experimental validation using proof-of-concept code (which varies from study to study 
and is unpublished). Our work is preparatory, allowing others to provide a more thorough 
analysis and to contribute to a shared “ecosystem” of experimental PDP implementations. 
We implemented a PDP module for the Charm cryptographic framework, a Python-based 
library for rapid cryptographic prototyping and benchmarking. We have developed a PDP 
application programmer interface (API) with documentation, implemented the simple 
Message Authentication Code PDP (MAC-PDP) scheme with unit tests, and provided 
efficient subroutines for sub-linear sampling in a cryptographic setting based on Floyd’s 
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algorithm. We hope these tools will facilitate further study in PDP performance 




The objective of this research is to develop a set of tools for the CHARM 
framework that enable studying PDP, a cryptographic tool for auditing big data. Our 
initial work implements the MAC-PDP scheme, a simple PDP scheme based on message 
authentication codes (MACs) to which many novel PDP schemes have been compared 
[4]. Here, we provide an overview of PDP schemes, the MAC-PDP scheme and the 
CHARM cryptographic framework. 
A. PDP 
PDP is a cryptographic protocol that enables a client to audit data on a remote 
location without accessing the whole file. When verifying the authenticity of the 
information stored on the server, strategies based on replication incur high cost and 
provide low integrity in the face of adversaries. Cryptographic signatures provide suitable 
integrity guarantees, but require the entire file be retrieved. With PDP we are able to get a 
probabilistic guarantee for integrity, at significant cost savings. Most PDP schemes have 
the property that its audit’s probabilistic guarantee can be exponentially amplified 
through repetition. Juels and Kaliski [4] and Naor and Rothblum [5] were the first to 
define these type of protocols. They describe different but related approaches to verify 
the authenticity of remote data: Provable Data Possession (PDP) and Proof of 
Retrievability (POR). Both approaches pre-process a file by splitting it into blocks, store 
the file remotely and then verify the file’s integrity using an interactive challenge-
response protocol. POR schemes have the additional property that this challenge-
response protocol admits an “extractor,” so that an efficient algorithm can be used to 
reconstruct the original file (i.e., if a server can consistently pass POR audits then the 
original file, in its entirety, can be recovered by the client). Their POR scheme uses 
special blocks called sentinels, hidden between other blocks in the data [6]. A number of 
PDP and POR schemes have since been proposed in the literature [6]–[13]. We focus on 
PDP schemes in this work but note the deep connections between PDP and POR 
schemes. 
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In general, a PDP scheme can be constructed in a few phases: (a) secret 
generation, (b) pre-processing or tagging and (c) an interactive proof phase. In the 
tagging phase the user pre-processes the file, generating some tag data and transmits this 
to the server with the file. The server stores the file and tag data, while the user stores 
only the key. In the proof phase, the user generates and sends a challenge to the server, 
the server responds to the challenge with a short proof, and the user verifies this proof.  
B. MAC-PDP 
MAC-PDP is a simple PDP scheme based on symmetric key cryptography. The 
idea is to break a file into blocks, create a short tag for each block using a message 
authentication code (MAC), and send both to the remote server. Then, a client can 
randomly sample blocks and their corresponding tags, verifying the integrity of each block. 
If this audit is passed then, with a high probability, portions of the file have not been lost, 
corrupted or tampered. We describe the phases and arguments for MAC-PDP, next. 
Protocol Phases. In the key generation phase of MAC-PDP, one chooses a 
random secret key, , that will be used to MAC each file block. In the pre-
processing phase, we split up the file M into n data blocks, each of length s. We choose a 
unique file name  for the file M. For each block b, we generate a MAC tag 
. We can store all of this data—unique filename, blocks and 
their tags—on the remote server. In the interactive proof phase, the client selects c 
random block indices and sends this to the server as a challenge. The server returns the c 
blocks and tags corresponding to those indices, as a proof. Finally, the client uses its 
secret key to verify the proof, re-computing each MAC and comparing to the stored tag. 
For a secure MAC, it is computationally infeasible for a malicious server to forge valid 
tag data, i.e., by inventing a new tag for an existing block or for totally inventing a new 
block/tag pair. We direct the interested reader to the security proof provided by Shacham 
and Waters for the MAC-PDP scheme, for details on these arguments [14]. 
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Complexity. The communication complexity for the client during the interactive 
proof phase is ( )( )logO c n . The communication complexity for the server during the 
interactive proof phase is , where σ is the length of the MAC digest.  
Parameter Selection. MAC-PDP gives a probabilistic guarantee that the remote 
server is storing authentic data. Let be the probability of the event that t blocks have 
deleted or corrupted, and that an audit of c random blocks detects one or more of these 
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Further, they observe that if t is more than 1% of the total number of blocks, this 
can be detected (with a probability of 99%) if the client challenges 460 data blocks [7].  
C. CHARM FRAMEWORK 
Charm is a framework for rapidly prototyping and benchmarking experimental 
cryptosystems. Charm is based on the Python programming language and it was designed 
to reduce code complexity by promoting reuse of cryptographic components within the 
framework [15]. Charm contains four “Base Modules” that implement various core 
cryptographic routines, written in C and optimized for efficiency: the crypto module 
(blockciphers), benchmark module, math module (big numbers, elliptic curve operations, 
pairing-based operations), and utilities module (base64 encoding and hash functions). 
Charm also contains a “Toolbox Module” that contains Python APIs exposing some of 
these cryptographic primitives, and a “Scheme Module” for various cryptographic 
schemes (e.g, Schnorr’s zero-knowledge proof system, and various public key signature 
schemes). It is important to note that Charm is not a library providing advanced 
cryptographic functions for production-ready systems: it ignores issues like standards 
compliance, secure coding practices and appropriate key management. It is a tool for 
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III. DESIGN 
We designed a generic PDP API for Charm by developing those interfaces any 
future PDP scheme would instantiate. Charm already supports a generic interactive 
protocol class, which our PDP base class extends. We were able to reuse many of the 
components already provided by Charm’s protocol engine: the client/server logic to 
establish the connection between the PDP challenger and the PDP prover, data 
serialization logic, and the logic defining protocol states and how to perform state 
transitions. We provide an overview of the PDP class interfaces, and the generic PDP 
protocol transitions. We refer to the local client that stores the file data as the 
“Challenger” and the remote data server which responds to audits as the “Prover.” Of 
course, some PDP schemes allow public audits in which the Challenger does not need to 
be the same party that initially stores the file. Without loss of generality, it is appropriate 
to assume these parties are the same for the purposes of rapid prototyping and 
measurement in Charm. Any production library for a PDP scheme offering public 
verifiability would likely make alternative design choices. 
A. PDP INTERFACES 
The PDP base scheme API consists of the following five interfaces:  
keyGen: Generates keys for use in the scheme.  
tag: Generates tag data to be stored with the Prover and tag data to be stored by 
the Challenger. Returns tag data related to the filename. 
generateChallenge: Generates a challenge that can be sent to a Prover. 
generateProof: Generates a proof, responding to a challenge. 
verifyProof: Checks to see if a proof is valid relative to its challenge. 
B. PDP PROTOCOL STATE TRANSITIONS 
Our PDP base class includes a generic three-round challenge-response protocol 
making use of the previous interfaces. We acknowledge that some PDP protocols may 
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have a different round structure. For those schemes, instead of inheriting the PDP base 
class protocol logic, an implementer would over-ride these routines in the child class. 
However, most existing PDP schemes are three-round interactive proofs, and will be able 
to inherit and re-use this protocol structure directly. The details of each of these states 
(see Figure 1) are outlined below. 
Challenger State 1:  This is the initial state for the Challenger. 
• Input: None 
• Processing: Generate public and private key data; pre-process the local file 
to create the tag data; sends the file and tag data to the remote server. 
• Sends M1: The file and its tag data. 
• Stores: Public and private key data and, if applicable, any private file-
specific data (used during verification). 
Prover State 2: The Prover enters this state upon receiving the message from 
State 1.  
• Input: Data from the Challenger, to be stored. 
• Processing: Store data and send acknowledgement. 
• Sends M2: An acknowledgement of success. 
• Stores: The file and its tag data. 
Challenger State 3: The Challenger issues a challenge to the Prover.  
• Input: Acknowledgement that the Prover is ready for an audit. 
• Processing: A challenge is generated and sent to the Prover.  
• Sends M3: A challenge. 
• Stores: The challenge, to be used during the verification stage. 
Prover State 4: The Prover generates a proof and sends it to the Challenger.  
• Input: A challenge. 
• Processing: The Prover generates a proof. 
• Sends M4: A proof. 
• Stores: None. 
Challenger State 5: The Challenger verifies the proof.  
• Input: A proof. 
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• Processing: The Challenger checks if the proof is valid. If the verification 
fails, go to the Fail state; if success and the maximum number of 
challenges have been issued, go to the Success state; otherwise, return to 
the state to issue another challenge. 
• Sends: The result of the audit. 
• Stores: The number of successful or failed audits. 
Prover State 6: The Prover receives the result from the Challenger.  
• Input: A status message indicating the result. 
• Processing: If the proof was verified and the maximum number of 
challenges has not been issued, return to respond to a new challenge; if the 
proof failed verification, go to the Fail state; otherwise, go to the Success 
state. 
• Sends: None. 
• Stores: None. 
Challenger State 7:  This is the Challenger Fail state.  
• Input: None. 
• Processing: None. The Challenger reaches this state after a proof fails an 
audit. 
• Sends: None. 
• Stores: None. 
Prover State 8: This is the Prover Fail state.  
• Input: None. 
• Processing: None. If the Prover reaches this state after any proof fails the 
audit. 
• Sends: None. 
• Stores: None. 
Challenger State 9: This is the Challenger Success state.  
• Input: None. 
• Processing: None. The Challenger reaches this state after all proofs pass 
the audit. 
• Sends: None. 
• Stores: None. 
Prover State 10: This is the Prover Success state.  
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• Input: None. 
• Processing: None. The Prover reaches this state after all proofs pass the 
audit. 
• Sends: None. 















Figure 1.  Data Flow Diagram 
C. CONCLUSION 
We have described the core interfaces provided by the PDP base class, which our 
MAC-PDP scheme implements. Next, we describe the MAC-PDP scheme 










































We discuss our implementation of the MAC-PDP scheme, which is a concrete 
instantiation of the previous interfaces. 
A. MAC-PDP 
MAC-PDP is a simple PDP scheme based on symmetric key cryptography. We 
implemented the following interfaces for the MAC-PDP scheme. 
keygen: Generates a symmetric key used to MAC blocks. 
• Input: None 
• Processing: Generate a private key using the randomBits function, 
provided by Charm’s integer module. 
• Output: The private key sk. The public key pk is empty. 
tag: Generates the tag data to be sent to the storage server.  
• Input: The name of the file to tag, and the key pair (sk, pk). 
• Processing: It breaks the file into blocks. It creates a unique filename, by 
appending a unique index to the filename. It creates a plaintext message 
by concatenating the unique filename, the block-number, and the block of 
data. A MAC for the plaintext is generated using Charm’s 
MessageAuthenticator class. 
• Output: The remotedata is a list of tags. The localdata is the number of 
blocks tagged. 
generateChallenge: Generates a list of m indices chosen randomly in the range 
[0, r), where r is the number of blocks, a value stored in localdata. The value m is a 
system parameter, set during the initialization routine. 
• Input: The localdata, holds the parameter r. 
• Processing: We select m indices in the range [0, r) without replacement, 
using Floyd’s Algorithm. 
• Output: The list of challenge indices. 
generateProof: This function returns the tags and blocks associated with the 
indices in the challenge. 
• Input: The challenge, remotedata and public key pk (empty). 
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• Processing: In this implementation, the tag data and file blocks are held in 
memory, in an array. Selecting the challenged blocks and tags is an array 
lookup. This implementation is not appropriate files that are too large to 
be held in-memory. 
• Output: The proof, an array of blocks and tags, in the order requested by 
the challenge. 
verifyProof: This algorithm verifies the proof sent in response to our challenge. 
• Input: The proof, challenge, and key pair (sk, pk). 
• Processing: We use the verify function of the MessageAuthenticator class 
to re-compute the MAC for each block, and compare with the 
corresponding tag. 
• Stores: True, if passed verification, False otherwise. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION DECISIONS  
Charm is a framework for prototyping cryptosystems and benchmarking 
individual cryptographic operations. We do not implement persistent storage and logic 
for handling files too large to be held in memory. Additionally, we do not implement 
logic for secure key storage or data serialization. We consider these tasks appropriate for 
production-worthy libraries, which is not the goal of Charm or in the scope of our work. 
In Charm, The Protocol class implements send and receive logic using a fixed-
size buffer. Even for our relatively small files, this buffer was too small to transfer the 
data during our tag phase. We modified the class to transmit data too large for the 
existing fixed size buffer. 
C. RANDOM SUBLINEAR SAMPLING 
When generating a challenge, we select a random subset of the block indices. This 
logic is implemented using Floyd’s algorithm to select random numbers without 
replacement. Floyd’s is an efficient algorithm and relatively simple to implement [16], 
yet no (or few) cryptographic libraries provide an interface for this functionality. The 
statistical software SAS provides the Simple Random Sampling algorithm, implemented 
using Floyd’s algorithm [17]. The software Clustal Omega—a program for aligning 
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protein sequences, developed by the Conway Institute UCD Dublin and founded by the 
Science Foundation Ireland—also implements1 Floyd’s algorithm [18].  
An alternative to Floyd’s algorithm is Knuth’s Algorithm S. Algorithm S is 
simpler in design, and it is easier to understand its correctness; it operates according to 
following: to select n elements from the set [0, M] we randomly select a number less than 
M and add this to our output if it has not previously been selected [16]. This algorithm is 
not as efficient as Floyd’s algorithm: in Floyd’s, we add a number to our list on every 
iteration.  
Another alternative to selecting n random numbers from a set M without 
replacement is the Knuth Shuffle, also known as the Fisher-Yates Shuffle. This method 
permutes the elements from the set [0, M] and chooses the first n numbers from the 
shuffled set. A proposed block-cipher mode for Datatype-Preserving Encryption (DTP) 
uses the Knuth Shuffle in one of its steps [19]. It may be advantageous to consider more 
efficient shuffling algorithms, like Floyd’s, in these applications. 
D. UNIT TESTING  
We developed unit tests using Python’s existing framework for automated testing. 
These tests run without user input, to implement a set of regression tests that can be used 
to ensure no library functionality becomes broken in the future. 
  
1 Floyd’s is implemented as the function RandomUniqueIntArray, found in src/clustal/util.c. 
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V. FUTURE WORK 
The Charm framework does not implement benchmarking for symmetric key 
crypto schemes. MAC-PDP is a scheme based on symmetric key cryptography. In order 
to measure the cost of MAC-PDP, benchmarking for symmetric key cryptography needs 
to be integrated into the charm framework. 
We developed a PDP interface and implemented MAC-PDP scheme as part of the 
Charm framework. Follow-on work might implement other PDP schemes described in 
the literature [6]–[13] in the Charm framework. 
  
 15 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
PDP is a cryptographic tool for auditing big data in the cloud. In this work we have 
developed a PDP module for the Charm cryptographic framework. We wrote an API for 
PDP schemes we believe is generic enough to describe all known PDP schemes. We 
implemented the simple MAC-PDP scheme with efficient subroutines for sub-linear 
sampling. We hope that this work will enable the rapid prototyping and evaluation of new 
PDP schemes in the Charm framework. 
  
 17 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 18 
APPENDIX A. PDPBASE 
Author: Krisztina 
Date: 05/04/2013 
PDP is a cryptographic process that enables a client to audit data on a remote location 
without accessing the whole file. 
 
class PDPBase.PDPBase(common_input=None)  
Bases: charm.core.engine.protocol.Protocol 
challenger_state1() 
This is the initial state for the Challenger. 
• Input: None 
• Processing: Generate public and private key data; pre-process the local file 
to create the tag data; sends the file and tag data to the remote server. 
• Message, M1: The file and its tag data. 
• Stores: Public and private key data and, if applicable, any private file-
specific data (used during verification). 
challenger_state3(input)  
The Challenger issues a challenge to the Prover. 
• Input: Acknowledgement that the Prover is ready for an audit. 
• Processing: A challenge is generated and sent to the Prover. 
• Message, M3: A challenge. 
• Stores: The challenge, to be used during the verification stage. 
challenger_state5(input)  
The Challenger verified the proof. 
• Input: A proof. 
• Processing: The Challenger checks if the proof if valid. If the verification 
failed, go to the Fail state; if success and the maximum number of 
challenges has been issued, go to the Success state; otherwise, return to the 
state to issue another challenge. 
• Message: The result of the audit. 
• Stores: The number of successful or failed audits. 
challenger_state7(input)  
This is the Challenger Fail state. 
• Input: None. 
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• Processing: None. The Challenger reaches this state after a proof fails an 
audit. 
• Message: None. 
• Stores: None. 
challenger_state9(input)  
This is the Challenger Success state. 
• Input: None. 
• Processing: None. The Challenger reaches this state after all proofs pass 
the audit. 
• Message: None. 
• Stores: None. 
generateChallenge(filestate, pk, sk) 
Generates a challenge c, that can be sent to a Prover. 
 
generateProof(challenge, pk)  
Generates a proof p, based on responding to a challenge. 
 
keygen() 
Generates keys for use in the scheme. 
 
prover_state10(input)  
This is the prover Success state. 
• Input: None. 
• Processing: None. The Prover reaches this state after all proofs pass the 
audit. 
• Message: None. 
• Stores: None. 
prover_state2(input)  
The prover enters this state upon receiving the message from State 1. 
• Input: Data from the Challenger, to be stored. 
• Processing: Store data and send acknowledgement. 
• Message, M2: An acknowledgement of success. 
• Stores: The file and its tag data. 
prover_state4(input)  
The prover generates a proof and sends it to the Challenger. 
• Input: A challenge. 
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• Processing: The Prover generates a proof. 
• Message, M4: A proof. 
• Stores: None. 
prover_state6(input)  
The prover receives the result from the Challenger. 
• Input: A status message indicating the result. 
• Processing: If the proof was verified and the maximum number of 
challenges has not been issued, return to respond to a new challenge; if the 
proof failed verification, go to the Fail state; otherwise, go to the Success 
state. 
• Message: None. 
• Stores: None. 
prover_state8(input)  
This is the Prover Fail state. 
• Input: None. 
• Processing: None. If the Prover reaches this state after any proof fails the 
audit. 
• Message: None. 
• Stores: None. 
set_attributes(**kwargs)  
Optional: sets various non-default properties for the PDP scheme. 
 
start_service(options)  
Sets up scheme, to act as either a Challenger or Prover service. 
 
tag(filename, pk, sk)  
Generates tag data to be stored with the file, (remote-data) and tag data to be 
stored by the Prover (local-data). Returns tagdata related to the filename. 
 
verifyProof(proof, challenge, pk, sk)  
Checks to see if a proof is valid relative to a challenge. 
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APPENDIX B.  MACPDPSCHEME 
Author: Krisztina 
Date: 05/04/2013 
MAC-PDP is a simple PDP scheme based on symmetric key cryptography. We 
implemented the following interfaces for the MAC-PDP scheme. 
class macpdpscheme.macpdpscheme(common_input=None)  
Bases: charm.toolbox.PDPBase.PDPBase 
generateChallenge(localdata, pk, sk)  
Generates a list of m indices chosen randomly in the range [0, r), where r is the 
number of blocks in localdata. The value m is a system parameter, set during the 
initialization routine. 
• Input: The localdata, holding the parameter r. 
• Processing: We select m indices in the range [0, r) without replacement, 
using Floyd’s Algorithm. 
• Output: The list of challenge indices. 
generateProof(challenge, pk, remotedata)  
This function returns the tags and blocks associated with the indices in the 
challenge. 
• Input: The challenge, remotedata and public key pk (empty). 
• Processing: In this implementation, the tag data and file blocks are held in 
memory, in an array. Selecting the challenged blocks and tags is an array 
lookup. This implementation is not appropriate files that are too large to 
be held in-memory. 
• Output: The proof, an array of blocks and tags, in the order requested by 
the challenge. 
keygen() 
Generates a symmetric key used to MAC blocks. 
• Input: None 
• Processing: Generate a private key using the randomBits function, 
provided by Charm’s integer module. 
• Output: The private key sk. The public key pk is empty. 
set_attributes(**kwargs)  
Sets optional attributes chosen by the user. Such attributes are: 
• key length 
• block size 
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• number of challenges 
tag(filename, pk, sk)  
Generates the tag data to be sent to the storage server. 
• Input: The name of the file to tag, and the key pair (sk, pk). 
• Processing: It breaks the file into blocks. It creates a unique filename, by 
appending a unique index to the filename. It creates a plaintext message 
by concatenating the unique filename, the block-number, and the block of 
data. A MAC for the plaintext is generated using Charm’s 
MessageAuthenticator class. 
• Output: The remotedata is a list of tags. The localdata is the number of 
blocks tagged. 
verifyProof(proof, challenge, pk, sk)  
This algorithm verifies the proof sent in response to our challenge. 
• Input: The proof, challenge, and key pair (sk, pk). 
• Processing: We use the verify function of the MessageAuthenticator class 
to re-compute the MAC for each block, and compare with the 
corresponding tag. 
• Stores: True, if passed verification, False otherwise. 
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